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COMMENTS
INCREASING THE FLOW OF PRIVATE FUNDS TO THE
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES: A PROPOSAL
If the underdeveloped nations of the world are to achieve their goal
of a substantial increase in their standards of living, they must import
private capital. Foreign investors, however, have recently shown a
reluctance to invest abroad because of the increasing risk of uncompen-
sated expropriation of their property. Several current proposals seek
to reduce this risk by limiting the power of states to acquire alien
property. This approach appears to be ineffective because of the
reluctance of the underdeveloped nations to agree to abide by foreign
standards of property treatment.
After outlining the nature of the problem and analyzing the
strengths and weaknesses of various plans and programs, this Note
suggests a fundamentally new approach to the difficulties posed by
expropriation. The basic thesis is that the flow of private capital can
be increased by granting the underdeveloped nations wide latitude in
acquiring foreign-owned property in exchange for an agreement to
compensate the investor whose property has been expropriated. This
scheme will grant the host nations their desired freedom from inter-
ference while developing their legal and economic systems. At the same
time, it will provide the investor with a higher degree of probability of
receiving adequate compensation following expropriation. This Note
develops this thesis and concludes with a model treaty which incor-
porates specific desirable features.
I. THE ECONOMIC SETTING
The current minimum capital needs of the underdeveloped nations
is estimated to be $19 billion per year.' This $19 billion is capable of
increasing the annual per capita growth rate of these countries from
one per cent to only two per cent. At the same time, the developed
1 Financhg of Economic Devclopment, U.N. Doc. Nos. E/4079/ Rev. 1 (1965);
A/5195/Rev. 1 (1961). These reports furnish the statistical source for nearly all
writing in the field. See e.g., ALPERT, EcoNwomc DEVELOPmENT 246 (1963) ; BErTHAM,
EcoNomIc Am TO UNDERDEVELOPED CouNTmiEs 65 (1962). Since the statistical base
had been changed between the two reports, the figures reported herein may be inter-
polative. Subsequent data is drawn from these sources unless otherwise indicated.
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nations are experiencing growth rates from three to five per cent. In
contrast to their needs, the total net capital received by the capital
importing, or host, nations from foreign sources has remained fairly
constant. The flow averaged a little over $5.4 billion per year during
the 1950's, increased steadily to $8 billion per year in 1961 and then
declined to $7.3 billion in 1963. The exact figures for 1964 are not yet
available, but latest estimates place the total investment flow for that
year at $7.9 billion, a significant increase over the previous year. The
economic gap between the underdeveloped and the developed is, curi-
ously, widening and not narrowing.2
An examination of the known sources of capital that are available
to developing countries illustrates the structure of the existing problem.
These sources break down into two general categories: domestic and
foreign, or internal and external. For present purposes, an examination
of the further divisions of domestic sources of capital is unnecessary,
for even in their total sum, they are generally inadequate to nurture
growth in the not-fully-industrialized countries. 3 It is probably true
that far more domestic capital is available in the underdeveloped
countries than has been utilized in the past because of the exorbitant
interest rates facing prospective borrowers, inadequate banking sys-
tems, the absence of fluid money markets, and the desire of firms, both
foreign and domestic, to export their earnings to the United States,
Switzerland or other financial havens. However, even if all available
domestic capital were to be utilized as efficiently as possible, it would
still, in the great majority of cases, prove inadequate.' The need for
external sources remains unquestionable.
Before examining the subdivisions of external sources of capital, it is
helpful to consider the overall financial situation in the underdevel-
oped, or capital-importing countries. In 1964 (a year of reversal
in the downward trend of capital imports) these countries were in their
best economic position in a decade. As a group, they were in fiscal
balance, i.e., their inflow of capital equalled their current account
2 Cf. MIaizels, The Effects of Industrialization on Exports of Primary-Producing
Countries, 14 KvYLos 18 (1961). Maizels' analysis is criticized by Bieda, The
Causes of the Export Lag of The Iirdustrializing Countries, 15 KYKLOs 4835 (1962).
Maizel replies, 15 KYKLOS 485, 493 (1962).
1HIGGINS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 569 (1959). For a critical analysis of the
point, see CAtRxcRoss, FACTORS Ir ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 39-74 (1962).
'ALPERT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 231. This inadequacy has been a common his-
torical phenomenon as is shown by the United States' demand for British capital
that lasted well into the nineteenth century and the continuing need of a country as
highly industrialized as Canada for United States capital to develop her resources.
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deficit plus marginal replacement of reserves.5 Unfortunately, opti-
mism fades when prices enter the picture.6 The improvement in terms
of trade begun in 1950 came to a sudden halt as import expenditures
caught up with export receipts.7 One reason for this is the high cost
of carrying fixed obligations. The ratio of debt service payments to
exports of the developing countries rose from four per cent in 1956 to
over eleven per cent in 1963. The rapid increase in the percentage
(and absolute) amount of interest payments has seriously affected the
liquidity of these nations. As it becomes increasingly difficult for them
to finance short-term operations and transactions, costs rise and profits
fall. And as export incomes fall, the effect of the fixed charge of debt
servicing is greatly magnified throughout the economy. Thus, if addi-
tional external funds are not available, reserves again may have to be
drawn down, a procedure which becomes increasingly difficult.
A further look into the external sources of capital is necessary.
These fall into three main groupings: unilateral official assistance
(foreign aid and long-term government loans), multilateral agency
loans (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(I.B.R.D.) and other development bank loans), and long-term private
capital. Historically, private funds have constituted a major source of
capital for underdeveloped nations." The total quantity of private
capital transferred to these nations, however, has declined steadily
from an average of $2.2 billion per year for 1950-1960 to $1.6 billion in
1963 (see chart 1, on following page). A sharp upturn appears to have
occurred in 1964, with that figure reaching $2.0 billion, which is still
below the average for 1950-1960. During the same period, the amount
of unilateral official assistance and multilateral agency loans to these
nations increased significantly. Thus, it can be seen that not only has
the absolute amount of direct private investment in the underdeveloped
countries generally decreased during the last decade, but until quite
recently, such funds have occupied a steadily decreasing percentage
of the total foreign capital received by these countries (see chart 2
" Financing of Economic Development, U.N. Doc. No. E/4079 (1964), at 6.
'For an analysis of the effect of prices in the trade of manufactured goods for
primary products, see BENHAM, op. cit. supra note 1, at 43; SINGER, INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH AND CHANGE 165 (1964).7This phenomenon is caused by a decrease in the price of primary products
which are exported by the underdeveloped nations relative to the cost of their
manufactured imports. World Economic Survey 1963, voL 1, Trade and Develop-
ment: Trends, Needs and Policies, U.N. Doc. No. E/3908 (1964), at 5.
'ALPERT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 231. Japan is a noteworthy exception, having
received her foreign capital mainly in the form of government loans.
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opposite). Unfortunately, the future trend of private investment can-
not be predicted at this time with the presently available statistical
data. Nevertheless, since official donations seem unlikely to increase
substantially beyond their present level for political reasons,9 and
since the cumulative costs of maintaining debt even at the minimum
multilateral agency rates appear to be skyrocketing, ° it is obvious
'Wriggins, Foreign Assistance and Political Development, in DEVELOPMENT OF
THE EMERGING COUNTRIEs-AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 181-214 (The Brookings
Institution 1962). See Morgenthau, A Political Theory of Foreign Aid, in DEij.or-
MENT AND SOCIETY 348-64 (Novak & Lekachman eds. 1964) for the author's proposals
in this area.
o SHON-FIELD, THE ATTACH ON WORLD POVERTY 148-50 (1961). But see MmEn.
LEADING ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 148 (1964), who argues that the
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CHART 2
that the economic need for expanding the flow of private capital has
become paramount.
The significant "fringe-benefits" which private capital produces in
recipient countries further justify efforts to increase export flow.
Private capital provides the countries with sorely needed foreign
exchange. Official donations or loans may require the recipient to
export surplus that would be necessary to cover costs will be created as long as
capital is distributed according to its most productive use and the excess spending
associated with inflation is avoided; Khatkhate, Debt-Servicing as An Aid to Promo-
tion of Trade of Developing Countries, 18 OxroRD ECONOMIC PAPERS 224 (1966),
where the author suggests that it is possible to promote the exports of developing
countries by linking their repayment liabilities to their exports.
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spend them in the country of the grantor.1 Investors, however, place
no such restrictions on their own capital and will tend to purchase
goods and services locally to the extent that adequate supplies of
acceptable quality are available. If such goods and services are not
available at the outset of the investment, the demand for them will
frequently prove to be so great that considerable quantities of local
capital will be drawn out to provide them.'" This effect will certainly
be most welcome in any country. Reinvested earnings from such
investments have in themselves constituted a good source of capital.
And if the investment is in the form of equity rather than debt,
industrial enterprises in countries which traditionally suffer from an
oppressive debt/equity ratio will be able to refinance on more attractive
terms.
The decline in the quantity of private funds available to under-
developed nations does not appear to be part of any worldwide trend.
On the contrary, during the fifties, the net international flow of
long-term private capital more than doubled.'" As noted earlier, during
the same period, the volume of transactions with the underdeveloped
nations remained relatively constant.' 4 Although current statistics are
not available on the flow of capital among the developed countries
themselves, it can be safely assumed that this circular flow continues
to exceed the amount that seeps out to the underdeveloped countries.Y5
Furthermore, when the amounts of private capital received by each of
the underdeveloped countries are examined, repetitive patterns ap-
pear.' 6 Among the Asian nations, for example, India, Israel, Malaysia,
Pakistan, and Thailand are the perennial favorites. In Africa, Nigeria
is the only country which has not shown a recent decline in foreign
private capital. Total flow of private capital to all Latin American
"MASON, FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY 41-51 (1964). But see SHONFiLD.
op. cit. supra note 10, at 160 where the author makes the case for more tied loans in
order to secure the cooperation of host countries in solving the donor countries'
balance of payments problems.
'See, e.g., Diamond, The Role of Private Institutions in Developmient Financing.
Int'l Develop. Rev., March 1965, p. 10. This raises the interesting question whether
investment should be placed in social overhead capital projects (public utilities)
to invite the establishment of new industries or immediately into "directly produc-
tive activities" (industries) to compel the establishment of both public utilities
and supportive industries. For an espousal of the latter position, see generally
HiRSCHMANN, THE STRATEGY OF EcONOMIc DEnoPmENT (1958).
' See International Flow of Long-Term Capital and Official Donations, 1051-1o59,
U.N. Doc. No. E/4079/ Rev. 1 (1965), at 37.
"See text accompanying note 2 supra.
See BENHAM, op. cit. supra note 1, at 65.
"Data on the flow patterns of individual countries is taken from Financing of
Economic Development, U.N. Doc. Nos. E/4079/ Rev. 1 (1965), table 12, p. 46.
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countries, except Surinam and Peru, has decreased over the past few
years and Venezuela has been experiencing a continual outflow of
private capital. The only Latin American country to show a relatively
high and relatively constant receipt of foreign private capital has been
Mexico.
II. CAUSES OF THE DECLINE IN FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Why have some private investors chosen to place their funds in some
foreign countries but not in others? In seeking an answer, it is perhaps
helpful to restate the question as "What makes the 'investment climate'
more attractive in one country than in another?" This so-called
"investment climate" is by no means a vague emotional reaction
experienced by an investor. It is rather the objective estimate of
several observable attitutes which greet the prospective investor. The
key elements comprise (1) a national policy favoring free enterprise,
both foreign and domestic; (2) a reasonable outlook for political
stability; (3) willingness of governments to honor their own commit-
ments and those of prior governments; and (4) a sound government
economic policy.17 When any of these is lacking, the investor senses
risk. And when the risk of loss counterbalances the expectation of
profits, the investor turns his attention to another country.
Risk of loss is, of course, an understandable fear on the part of the
investor. Uncompensated, or partially compensated, expropriation has
occurred so often in the last ten years-in Egypt, Indonesia and Cuba,
to mention but a few instances-that investors are unable to justify
further investments in these or in similarly situated countries.'8 When
they do place capital in high-risk areas, a related problem arises. The
investor can justify high risks only by the possibility of high profits.
The existence of a wide profit margin in alien-owned industry is never
appreciated by an underdeveloped country, and so the probability of
expropriation may even increase as investors feel that risk increases.
A circle of investor apprehension and local reaction may be established,
in which nationalization becomes an inevitable result.
At the same time, it must be realized that risk of loss reflects only
one side of the problem. The host nations are currently in the process
of developing their own political and legal structures, and a flexible
policy toward private property, whether owned by nationals or by
'Ray, Law and the Perfecting Process, in SYmPosIUM ON RIGHTS A-D DuTiES
o PRIVATE INVESTORS ABRoAD 31 (1965).
' ALPERT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 234.
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foreigners, is of prime importance.'9 Faced with official insistence on
the right of the State to acquire private property subject to few
restraints in the nature of due-process, foreign private parties find they
can do little to create an investment climate attractive to themselves.
An occasional exception may occur when large companies possess
essential skills or marketing contracts relating to a product which is,
or will be, the mainstay of the local economy.2 0 The underdeveloped
country in such a setting finds itself in a monopsonistic situation and
may be forced to guarantee local stability in exchange for the lucrative
purchase agreements. Such situations become rarer all the time. The
most that the investor can generally hope for is that the new nations
will eventually develop the requisite respect for property and political
stability. Certain steps, however, can be taken by the interested
nations to encourage the flow of private investment into these unat-
tractive areas. Proposals of great variety have been urged by both
capital importers and exporters. These have, for the most part, tried
to generate an attitude of respect toward investment in nations
not yet ready to accept it. In so doing, they have unfortunately fallen
short of their mark of reduction of risk.
III. LEGAL APPROACHES
One means of focusing on the often diverging interests of the
investor and the host nation is to examine programs designed, in one
way or another, to increase investment of private capital in under-
developed nations. Existing programs may be conveniently placed in
three groupings: (a) unilateral measures, (b) bilateral agreements
and (c) multilateral conventions.
A. Unilateral Measures
These are of two types: state legislation and insurance schemes.
Several capital importing states have enacted, on their own, legislation
-to encourage investment.2 Such enactments typically take the form
"Murphy, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 125,
130-31 (1966).
See Note, Avoiding Expropriation Loss, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1666, 1673 n.38
(1966).
"The more important of these have been catalogued in Financing of Econwmic
Development, U.N. Doc. No. E/3665/ Rev. 1, Ann. II (1962), and U.N. Doc. No.
E/3905, at Add. l/Ann. I.
Occasionally, developed nations have granted significant tan-relief measures to
their investors operating in underdeveloped countries. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §§ 921-922 for the benefits afforded a "Western Hemisphere Trading Corpora-
tion," and § 902 for provisions generally applicable to taxpayers with operations in
underdeveloped countries.
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of general statements expressing the interest of the host country in
attracting foreign capital and a plan of tax concessions. Some countries
even go so far as to guarantee freedom from expropriation. The
guarantee, however, is only as good as the word of the country itself.
If the country decided to nationalize, it is unlikely that such a guaran-
tee would provide an obstacle to its plans. It is most unlikely that
such legislation would in itself overcome a country's unhealthy reputa-
tion. In fact, such legislation, while it may be very charitable on its
face, is frequently directed toward only one industry or even only one
company which is operating under a closed concession.22
One fairly recent legislative proposal by the country of Uganda
provides a type of arrangement that may in fact increase the probabil-
ity of an investor receiving compensation after expropriation .2  The
act provides for a system of registrations of foreign investments and
the issuance of certificates for those activities which will aid in the
economic development of Uganda. These certificates show on their
face the total assets of the enterprise and the portion of these assets
which is represented by foreign capital. There are provisions for the
subsequent amendment of these figures when a substantial variation
in the value of the assets occurs. The act reserves the right of the
government to acquire such assets by eminent domain in accordance
with a provision of the Uganda Constitution which contains a detailed
description of the limited situations in which the government may take
the property of a private individual, citizen or alien.24 These constitu-
tional limitations reflect the typical restrictions placed on governments
in common law countries. If an approved investment is taken by the
government, compensation will be paid within six months from the
date of the taking, in respect to the approved proportion of the valu-
ation specified on the certificate. An investor, finding his property
appropriated by the state, is guaranteed access to the Uganda High
Court to determine his interest or to challenge the legality of the
acquisition or the adequacy of the compensation.
It is true that this legislation is again no more compulsory upon the
country of Uganda than its word, but it does reflect a sincere effort on
the part of a country to establish a realistic scheme whereby it reserves
'For the view that such legislation has a positive value to foreign investors
by reducing the probability of breach of specific provisions, see Meier, Legal-
Economic Problems of Private Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 33
U. CH. L. REv. 463, 492 (1966).
'The Foreign Investment (Protection) Act, [1964], 3 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1062(1964).
.'UGANIDA CONST. art. 22, in 3 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1065 (1964).
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the right to acquire private property, whether domestic or foreign
owned, yet assures the owner compensation in an amount to which he
has agreed. Furthermore, should Uganda default on its bargain, the
investor would have an arrangement on which to seek redress by local,
or via the intervention of his state, international tribunals. The legisla-
tion is unfortunately still a unilateral declaration, and no unilateral
declaration can provide complete protection to the cautious investor.
The more successful unilateral arrangements have proven be the
insurance plans which are offered by the United States, Japan, and the
Federal Republic of Germany to their own investors .2  These are
similar in form, and a description of the United States' guarantees
will suffice. There are two types: specific26 and extended27 risk. The
specific risk insurance guarantees the investor against damages caused
by non-convertibility of currency; expropriation; or war, revolution,
and insurrection, while the extended risk coverage protects him against
general commercial hazards.
Because these programs offer a high probability of compensation in
an expropriation situation, they have proven to be very popular.2 8
They do, nevertheless, suffer from inherent defects. Any insurance
plan, by its very nature, substitutes compensation for stability. Invest-
ment is encouraged by reducing risk to a particular investor, but the
host country may feel little incentive to create a more attractive invest-
ment climate through its own efforts. In fact, not only need the
country not actively pursue private investment, but it may even allow
its treatment of investments and investors to deteriorate to a point at
which no private capital would flow into the country, were the foreign
insurance programs not in existence. If such a deterioration were to
occur it would almost inevitably result in a loss of capital from other
uninsured sources, both public and private. Of course, the mere possi-
bility of dissatisfaction of the United States in its role as subrogee may
have a certain in terrorem effect, and may decrease the possibility of
expropriation.
In addition to this fundamental defect, these plans have other short-
'The three plans are compared in Annex A to I.B.R.D., MULTLATERAL IN-
VESTMENT INSURANCE (1962).
.U.S.A.I.D., DEP'T OF STATE, SPEcIFc RIsK INVESTMENT GUPAI=rY HANDBOOK(1965) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
I U.S.A.I.D., DEP'T OF STATE, Ams TO BusIN~ss (OVERSEAS INVESTMENT) (1965).
' 778 insurance contracts with a face value of over $1.4 billion had been written
by December 31, 1963. Armstrong, The United States Government's Investment
Guaranty Program, 20 Bus. LAw. 27 (1964).
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comings. They can be very expensive.29 If the project is one that
requires a substantial fixed capital investment relative to returns, e.g.,
a large utility or mining project where before-tax returns are expected
to be, say, ten to twelve per cent of the investment, perhaps "sweet-
ened" with a tax concession, the annual premiums may exceed ten per
cent of the before-tax returns. (The premiums in the footnoted example
varied from 4.5 per cent to 10.5 per cent of current earnings!) This
effect is even more discouraging where attempts are made to duplicate
the high-volume low-profit types of United States marketing opera-
tions, such as supermarkets and "five-and-ten cent" stores. Such
insurance costs may gravely affect the economics of the enterprise
and may even prevent utilization of the option to insure.
Also, these coverages are designed to encourage new investments
and are therefore not available to existing investments." This is bad
enough, but "existing" is interpreted to mean existing de jure rather
than de facto." Thus, if the contract is signed, the investment is
ineligible even if no transfer of capital has occurred, although there
are administrative techniques to avoid this adverse determination.
These plans are not available in all underdeveloped countries, nor are
all types of coverage available in each country."2 Thus, an investor,
even if he is desirous of coverage, may find it unavailable to him.
'To determine his cost, the investor decides first the maximum amount of
coverage that he may desire at any time during the period of the guarantee, and
then how much he desires for the present year. The premium for the amount actually
in force is '1 of 1% and the premium for the standby coverage (equal to the difference
between the maximum amount and amount actually in force) is 3Ao of 1%. This pre-
mium is for each of the coverages desired. For example, say an investor plans a
$1,000,000 investment and desires total coverage against expropriation and insurrec-
tion when the project is completed, but only $300,000 at the present due to its
present state of development. He also plans to repatriate capital later on in amounts
of $100,000 per annum as profits accrue. His premiums them amount to:
Convertibility: Standby-100,000 at 'A0 of 1% = $100
In force--O
Expropriation: Standby-700,000 at lAo of 1% = $70
In force-300,000 at V of 1% = $1500
Insurrection: Standby-700,000 at 1A0 of 1% = $700
In force-$300,000 at Y2 of 1% = $1500
The total annual premium is, at its minimum amount at the inception of the invest-
ment $4500, or 1.5% of his initial assets. At its maximum, the cost will be Y2 of 1%
of $100,000, plus Y2 of 1% of $1,000,000, plus Y2 of 1% of $1,000,000=$10,500, or just
over 1% of his total assets.
If an investor desires insurance covering any conceivable commercial risk, save
his own fraud, this can be issued under the extended risk program at a rate of up to
lYj% of the insured portion of the investment (75% of the total except in housing
investments). This is in place of the specific risk coverage, although that can be
used to cover the remaining 25%. Unfortunately, this coverage is available only to
A.I.D. approved projects and not to all commercial ventures.
Z HANDBOOK 6.
'
1 Id. at 7.
'Id. app. D.
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Whether payment will be made in cases of expropriation short of a
total taking, i.e., "creeping expropriation," is an unanswered question.
Perhaps in keeping with the spirit of the plan it would be, but the
insured would have a heavy burden to prove the extent of his losses.33
B. Bilateral Agreements
The typical illustration of these is the Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation (F.C.N.) treaties proposed by the United States. Recently,
Japan, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
Switzerland have initiated their own treaties of this variety. These
are based upon the principles of national or most-favored-nation treat-
ment.34 It is impractical to discuss any one treaty as being typical of
the group because of the variations among their provisions. However,
some generalizations can be made.3 5 Most treaties provide citizens of
both signatories the freedoms of travel into, within, and from their
territories. They also provide a host of commercial privileges.3" These
latter provisions frequently include freedom from unreasonable or
discriminatory measures which would impair legally acquired rights
or interests; protection and security of property; prompt, adequate
and effective compensation in instances where property is taken for
a valid public purpose; and national treatment, while engaging in
business activities, in acquiring property by any means, with respect
to patents and trademarks, as to taxes, as to exchange of funds, and
as to import and export regulation.
There is no doubt that these treaties have done much to improve
relations and communications between the signatory nations.37 They
have also served as an encouragement to investors. They do, however,
appear to be of questionable value in resolving an expropriation contro-
The development of more liberal definitions of "Expropriatory Action" in the
insurance contracts is illustrated in Miller and Christy, The United States Govent-
ment's Investment Guaranty Program, 2 Bus. LAW. 789, 790 (1964). It is interesting
to note that the authors were the chiefs of the Investment Guarantees Division and
the Extended Risk Guarantees Division, Agency for International Development.
34 WILSON, UNITED STATES ComamaaciAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 113
(1960). It is significant to note that the United States has abdicated its traditional
espousal of the international standard as the basis of treatment for its citizens and,
insofar as this treaty series is concerned, has based liability on more explicit
provisions. The current trend is toward guaranteeing treatment "no less favorable
than that received by nationals of the other party."
' See generally, Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion, 42 MINN. L. REv. 805, 807 (1958).
" See, e.g., Treaty With Japan [1953], 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A., 2063 T.I.A.S. 2863, 206
U.N.T.S. 143, at 193, arts. I through XIV.
I Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment:
Present United States Practice, 5 Am. J. ComP. L. 229 (1956).
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versy between the two signatories. These treaties are written with
broad and ambiguous phraseology and permit potentially wide excep-
tions. Most of them allow both countries to take whatever measures
they deem necessary to protect their "essential security interests."3 8
Quaere: Could not discriminatory and uncompensated expropriations,
which are in direct violation of other articles, be justified by this
provision under certain circumstances? Significantly, the concept of
a "taking" does not appear to be defined with sufficient precision to
cover "creeping expropriations." Acquisitions of this type expropriate
an investor's property without acquiring his legal title. Possible tech-
niques include excessive and discriminatory taxation, denial of access
to essential raw materials or to markets, or unreasonable labor regula-
tions. All of these activities presumably could be justified by local
courts as measures necessary to protect their "essential security inter-
ests." The investor himself has no standing to pursue his claim. His
own country must espouse his cause of action and when this occurs
his government controls the further course of the litigation. Finally,
since only ten of the United States' F.C.N. treaties which have been
concluded with developing countries contain provisions relating to
compensation upon expropriation,39 the prospective investor is likely
to find that the treaty with the country which will be the site of his
project does not contain clauses designed to protect his interests.
These treaties, being bilateral in nature, have one essential advantage:
they are relatively easy to enter into. This feature is retained in the
Proposal.
C. Multilateral Conventions
At present, there are three significant proposals for multilateral
conventions. Two of these have been proposed by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.). The first
deals with protection of investments, per se, and the second is a multi-
lateral insurance scheme. The third proposal, known as the Harvard
Draft, also deals with protection of investments in the narrow sense.
Pugh, Legal Protection of Internaticnal Transactions Against Non-Commercial
Risks in International Business Transactions, in INTERNATIONAL BusiNESS TRANS-
ACTIONS 330 (Surrey ed. 1963). See, e.g., Treaty With Japan, supra note 36, at art.
XXI(1)d.
Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, Israel, Korea, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Republic of China,
Republic of Vietnam, and the Sultanates of Muscat and Oman and Dependencies.
Vaughn, Finding the Law of Expropriation: Traditional vs. Quantitative Research,
2 TEXAS INT'L L. F. 189 (1966).
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It was prepared by Professors Sohn and Baxter at the request of the
United Nations.
The Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property of the
O.E.C.D.4 0 was designed almost exclusively to cope with the problems
of "creeping expropriation." It rests upon what the O.E.C.D. considers
to be a "well-established principle of international law"' that a state
is bound to respect and to protect the property of nationals of other
states by providing (1) fair and equitable treatment, (2) most constant
protection and security, and (3) freedom from unreasonable or dis-
criminatory measures. This principle is implemented by the prohibi-
tion of "takings" which deprive an investor, directly or indirectly, of
his property, unless there exists (1) public interest requiring the taking
and due process of law in its accomplishment, (2) an absence of
discrimination or acts contrary to another agreement, and (3) pro-
visions for payment of just compensation which is to be of "genuine
value" and transferrable without delay. "Property" is subsequently
defined to mean all property, rights and interests, whether held directly
or indirectly, including the interest which a member of a company is
deemed to have in the property of the company.42
The O.E.C.D. Draft, therefore, establishes in each state the same
rights and duties with respect to private property as the developed
nations have traditionally possessed. Not surprisingly, the under-
developed nations have staunchly defended their power to develop
laws of property as they alone see fit. These laws may or may not
turn out to be identical to those of the developed countries. Because
the underdeveloped nations view the O.E.C.D. Draft as an attempt to
force unpopular legal concepts upon them, it seems unlikely that it
will gain wide acceptance.43
The Harvard Draft, properly known as the Draft Convention on
the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic
Interests of Aliens,4 is similarly based upon what its authors consider
an international minimum standard of protection for private prop-
"02 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 241 (1963).
' Id. art. 3, Comment A (1), at 249.
' Id. art 9(c), at 262.
1 Arguments attempting to overcome this fault have been put forth by stating
that the O.E.C.D. has developing countries among its members-Greece, Ireland,
Spain and Turkey. Cf. A.B.A., PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY INVESTED ABROAD
66 (1963). These countries, with the possible exception of Turkey, are at the upper
end of any list of developing countries. For a comprehensive analysis of the various
criteria for the economic classification of countries, see generally ENKE, ECONOMICS
FOR DEVELOPMENT (1963), particularly chs. 2 & 3.
"' See Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic
Interests of Aliens, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 545 (1961).
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erty.4" Unlike the O.E.C.D. proposal, the Harvard Draft gives the
individual investor a direct cause of action.46 Like the O.E.C.D.
scheme, the Harvard Draft provides liberal definitions of both "prop-
erty" and "taking" and makes a wrongful taking actionable. Accord-
ing to the Harvard Draft, a taking (or a using) of the property of an
alien is wrongful if (1) it is not for a public purpose clearly recognized
as such by a law of general application in effect at the time of the
taking, or if it is in violation of a treaty; or (2) if it is not accompanied
by prompt payment of compensation in accordance with the highest of
the following standards: (a) national treatment, (b) fair market
value, or (c) just compensation in terms of fair value if no fair market
value exists. A taking, furthermore, includes not only an outright
taking, but also any unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment
or disposal of such property. "Property" is defined simply as all
movable or immovable property, whether tangible or intangible, and
the term includes all industrial, literary and artistic property, as well
as rights and interests in any property.4 7
The Harvard Draft, although harking to international standards a
little more clearly than the O.E.C.D. scheme, still imposes upon poten-
tial signatories principles to which they do not, and probably will not,
accede. Thus, Sohn and Baxter's proposals likewise would prevent
developing nations from developing their own laws as they see fit.
The International Investment Guarantee Corporation48 was pro-
posed by the O.E.C.D. upon the suggestion of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (U.N.C.T.A.D.). It involves
the creation of a new corporation, the International Investment Guar-
antee Corporation, (I.I.G.C.) to operate under the auspices of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.).
Member countries are divided into three groups: (a) capital exporting
or "contributing members" who share losses; (b) capital importing
or "host countries" who subrogate their rights under the claims to the
I.I.G.C. and who agree to settle any claims against them; and (c)
consulting members who are merely advisory. The I.I.G.C. would be
legally separated from the I.B.R.D. and would be administered by its
own council with all member countries entitled to one vote each therein.
The guarantee operations would be supervised by a board containing
a majority of category (a) members.49
' Id. at 547.
' Id. art. 1, § 2(a), at 548. "15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 92, 94 (1966).
'T Id. art. 10, at 553-54. 49 Ibid.
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In operation, losses are shared according to a special formula which
apportions the loss among those countries which approved the eligibil-
ity of the particular investment for guaranties. The first one-half is
allocated to those countries which actually purchased guarantees and
the second is allocated to those countries which approved the defaulting
country for investment guaranties but did not purchase any guarantees
in this case. Financing would be strictly by premium and calls; there
would be no funding.5"
This scheme is, naturally enough, favored by the host country bloc,
but has been criticized by some of the contributing members." There
appear to be some countries who want no part of the responsibility
for sharing another's losses. Taking the insurance plan from a national
operation to an international one would perhaps overcome some of the
criticisms levied against the unilateral approaches. Such a plan might
mollify somewhat a host country's attitudes toward expropriation, but
is unlikely to cause a major shift in its political views towards investors
if it is not paying the premiums. It is too early to evaluate this
proposal thoroughly, but it does not appear to have the universal
acceptance necessary for adoption. The O.E.C.D. may have over-
reacted to criticisms of their prior Draft Convention, for now it is the
capital exporters that consider the I.I.G.C. treaty one-sided.
The I.B.R.D. itself has come up with what appears to be a more
promising approach in its Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, of March 18,
1965. This Convention calls for the establishment of a "Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes," which shall permanently maintain
a panel of conciliators and arbitrators. Jurisdiction "shall extend to
any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment" 2 between a
contracting state and a national of another contracting state. Both
parties must consent to jurisdiction, and once consent has been given,
it cannot be unilaterally withdrawn. Furthermore, once the dispute
has been submitted to arbitration, no contracting party may bring an
international claim on behalf of its national unless the other state has
failed to comply with the award.5 3 The Convention avoids the question
of sovereign immunity, and specifically states that any of its provisions
50 Ibid.
"lIbid.
" I.B.R.D. Convention, art. 25, March 18, 1965.
' Id. art. 27(1).
'Id. art. 55. But see Note, 79 HAv. L. REV. 1666, 1669 (1966), wherein it is
suggested that the language might be interpreted as allowing the defense of sovereign
immunity from jurisdiction.
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relating to enforcement of an award shall not be construed as deroga-
ting the internal laws of a contracting state relating to immunity. 4 In
absence of any agreement as to the applicable rules of law, however,
the Centre's tribunal will apply the law of the host state, including its
rules on conflict of laws, and applicable international law.
The real advantage of this plan is that it gives the individual
claimant a cause of action. He need no longer convince his own state
to espouse his claim and then commit the entire course of the proceed-
ings to its hands. Once his state has acceded to the Convention, he
may request the Centre to exercise jurisdiction.55 Of course, consent
of the defaulting state must be secured, but, at least in major projects
where direct dealings with the state are involved, that can be acquired
during the original contract negotiations. It may also be that some
acceding states can be persuaded to pass legislation embodying a
general consent to jurisdiction.
Another distinct advantage is that the plan calls for arbitral and
not judicial proceedings. This will give the proceedings considerably
more flexibility and will ameliorate several onerous burdens of proof
normally borne by claimants in disputes of this kind. Along with
arbitration, conciliation is provided for, 6 and hopefully many dis-
putes could be resolved at that stage. The Centre's tribunal is utilized
under the Proposal.1
7
IV. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN LITIGATION FOLLOWING
EXPROPRIATION
The foregoing has examined the relative strengths and weaknesses
of the various programs aimed at increasing private investment. The
often-divergent interests of the foreign investor and the developing
nation have been indicated. Key elements in expropriation contro-
versies are now treated and solutions suggested.
A. Access
Unless a treaty has given the investor access to the courts, he
generally must be content to allow his own nation to prosecute his
claim for him. This involves first persuading his nation to espouse
his claim and then surrendering the entire course of the litigation to
I.B.RD. Convention, art. 36, March 18, 1965.
Id. art. 1(2).
On September 14, 1966, the Convention received its twentieth ratification and
went into effect on October 14, 1966. Am. Soc. Int'l Law, Letter to Members,
October 1966.
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it. As a rule, the United States will not intervene in cases involving
breaches of contract between a United States citizen and a foreign
state, absent a strong showing of a denial of justice. 8 The Government
refuses to consider itself a collection agency, and will not enforce
contractual undertakings freely entered into by its nationals. If the
need of the underdeveloped nations for more private capital forces
a change in the political attitudes of the United States, this restraint
may be lifted, but thus far there have been no indications to that
effect.
If access to a foreign court cannot be obtained by either the individ-
ual or his state, recourse must be had to the International Court of
Justice. Here again, the state, not the injured party, must be the
prosecutor.5 9 Furthermore, not all states have accepted the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in matters
concerning international law or obligations.60 By virtue of the so-
called "Connally Amendment," '61 the United States does not submit
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the international Court of Justice
in matters which it decides are within its domestic jurisdiction. Conse-
quently, under generally accepted views as to reciprocity of obligations,
a respondent state, which did in fact accept -the compulsory jurisdiction
of the court (i.e., the power of the court to decide for itself whether
the matter falls within its jurisdiction, and if jurisdiction is found,
to determine the substance of the dispute) can still refuse to submit
to the jurisdiction of the court in a matter which it considers to be
within its own domestic jurisdiction when the United States is com-
plainant.
Assume the claimant preferred to seek satisfaction through arbitra-
tion, it will be difficult to get the expropriating state to agree to it after
the fact. Some countries flatly refuse to have anything to do with
arbitration. Saudi Arabia, for example, has declared that none of
its state agencies may conclude contracts providing for arbitration
save in concession cases wherein it is to the utmost advantage of the
state to submit to arbitration.
Access is clearly desirable from the investor's point of view and,
5 HACKWORTH, INTERrATIONAL LAW 610 (1943).
Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. (1945), art. 34, para. 1.
o Id. art. 36, para. 2. This is the "Optional Clause."
0161 Stat. 1218 (1946), 15 DFP'T STATE BuLL. 452. The "Amendment" qualifies
the acceptance by the United States of the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice as required by its statute, note 60 supra.
' Council of Ministers Dec. No. 58 (17/1/1383), 25 June 1963, 3 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 45 (1964).
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there appears to be no reason why a treaty cannot grant the individual
claimant standing to prosecute his own claim. As to the forum for
prosecuting claims, however, litigation in the courts of foreign coun-
tries seems ineffective.63 The I.B.R.D. Centre, discussed earlier, has
far more appeal to investors and therefore it is the forum adopted in
the Proposal for settlement of disputes. 4 Access to all courts is
specifically denied.65
B. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is generally considered to be waivable by inter-
national agreement. 6 The United States has taken the position that
sovereign immunity may be expressly waived by either treaty or
contract.17 The effect of this waiver depends considerably upon the
location of the forum. If suit is instituted in the expropriating state
and waiver is retracted,68 probably little can be done, other than appeal
of the decision to the International Court of Justice. The same would
apply if the waiver did not exist and the local courts allowed the plea
of sovereign immunity to be interjected. On the other hand, if suit
were to be brought in the United States, and an expression of waiver
did exist, the courts would not honor a request of retraction.69 If no
agreement had been reached beforehand, however, the defense of
sovereign immunity would be in dispute. Since the issuance of the
"Tate Letter,17 0 the United States has adhered to the "restrictive
theory" of sovereign immunity in acting upon requests of foreign
governments for immunity. The "restrictive theory" holds that a
grant of immunity will be issued only if the act in question is a public
and not a private act of the state. This determination is to be made
by the executive and its decision transmitted to the courts. The
' See generally Rivkin, Interiational Litigation and Arbitration, in INTEL-
NATIONAL BusN-ss TRANSACTIONS, op. cit. supra note 38, at 962. The author in-
vestigates problems of procedure as well as of enforcement.
Proposal, art. IV, para. A.
Id. art. IV, para. C.
See generally Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 6 HARv. INT'L L. CLUB J.
189 (1965).
1' RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LA OF THE UNITED STATES§ 70 nn.1 & 2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] ; Comment, Sovereign
Inmnunitv-Vaiver and Execution: Arguments from Continental Jurisprudence,
74 YALE L.J. 887, 895-96 (1965).
I British Courts specifically recognize the right of a sovereign to retract its
waiver of immunity during the proceedings. Kahan v. Pakistan Federation, [1951]
2 K.B. 1003, 1012. It is not unlikely that courts of underdeveloped Commonwealth
nations will follow this view.
'Flota Maritirna Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la
Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1964).
" 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
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courts have universally deferred to the decisions of the Department
of State in these matters.71
Since a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be exacted from each
signatory to the Proposal,72 it is important to determine whether a
country other than the United States can waive its immunity by treaty.
There is, unfortunately, no rule of law precisely in point. The tendency
of nations to adopt the "restrictive theory" is indicative of a trend
toward the acceptance of suit in all commercial matters without prior
inquiry into the nature of the litigation.7 3 If a state can adopt this
procedural device (i.e., the "restrictive theory") as part of its juris-
prudence, there appears to be no reason why it could not agree to
adopt it in a treaty.74 The ability of a state to waive its immunity
in this manner is by no means settled, however, and the only safe
course appears to be to determine the capacity of each potential
signatory.
C. The Act of State Doctrine
An alien whose property has been expropriated and who is seeking
compensation in the courts of his own country may find his remedies
barred by the act of state doctrine which prohibits the courts of one
state from sitting in judgment upon the acts of another state committed
within the latter's territory.75 If the doctrine is applicable, compensa-
tion is obtainable only through political channels. The doctrine is not
a rule of international law, but a policy of judicial restraint and defer-
ence to the executive in foreign affairs which has been accepted by
only a few politically advanced Western nations. 6 It was adopted by
the United States for the first time in Underhill v. Hernandez.77
"This procedure was followed in the recent case of Rich v. Naviera Vacuba
S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). The case is strongly criticized by Lillich, who
refers to it as one which "bids fair to become one of the international legal
monstrosities of American courts for the 1 960's" because of the insistence of the
judiciary to defer to the executive position which fluctuated with the political
situation. LILLIcH, THE PROTE TION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 17 (1965).
"Proposal art. IV, para. D.
See Note, Sovereign Immunity of States Engaged in Commercial Activities,
65 CoLum. L. REv. 1086 (1965). A notable exception is the U.S.S.R. The English
position is presently unclear.
" It is interesting to note that most of the recent F.C.N. treaties provide for
waiver of immunity for state-owned commercial enterprises. See, e.g., Treaty With
Japan, supra note 36, art. XVIII, para. 2.
' See generally Domke, Fridmann & Henkin, Act of State: Sabbatino i the
Courts and in. Congress, 3 COLUm. J. INT'L L. 90 (1965).
"See generally Paul, The Act of State Doctrine: Revived but Suspended. 113
U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1965).
"168 U.S. 250 (1897). For an excellent discussion of this case, see Paul, supra
note 76.
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The degree of confusion and uncertainty which this doctrine adds
to an already complex area of the law is well illustrated by the recent
Sabbatino litigation 8 and legislation.79 The doctrine was brought up
during the controversy in the United States courts over funds paid
by an agent of the Cuban government for a commercial sale which
took place at exactly the same time as the Cuban nationalizations.
The Supreme Court, reversing the holdings of the district and appellate
courts, refused to inquire into the legality of the seizures by Cuba
under international law. Instead, the Supreme Court created a variant
of the Underhill approach, which prohibited an inquiry into the legality
of "a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign ... gov-
ernment ... in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement
regarding controlling legal principles.""0 For present purposes the
critical question is, "What constitutes an 'unambiguous' agreement
regarding controlling legal principles?" It would appear from the lan-
guage in the case that an injured party, without benefit of a narrow
treaty provision specifically delimiting his cause of action, will have
an arduous task establishing "controlling legal principles" in order to
persuade the court to inquire into the validity of the taking.
The Sabbatino decision has now been abrogated, at least in part, by
legislation. The Sabbatino Amendment reverses the presumptions of
the Sabbatino decision upon which the courts will investigate the
validity of the taking. Since the act of state doctrine is a matter of
judicial deference to the executive, it makes a great deal of difference
whether the court presumes that it can act absent executive disap-
proval, or presumes that it cannot act absent executive approval. The
presumption, in this country, has always been the latter, and the
executive approval has been known as the Bernstein Exception.8' The
existence or non-existence of Bernstein Letters figured heavily in the
controversy in the lower courts, 2 but any possibility of existence of
such executive authority to proceed was retracted from issue before
"'Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), reversing 307
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), which ajf'd 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The case on
remand is reported sub non., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
' Subsection 301(d) (4) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 1013,
22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e) (2) (Supp. 1965). Hereinafter referred to as the Sabbatino
Amendment.
"1376 U.S. at 428.
' The name of the exception comes from the Bernstein litigation: Bernstein v.
Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772(1947); sub nora. Bernstein v. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatshappij,
210 F2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Comment, 62 COLUm. L. Rav. 1278 (1962).
" 193 F. Supp. at 381; 307 F.2d at 858, 859.
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the Supreme Court by the Department of State. 3 Motivated in part by
the Sabbatino controversy, Congress formally enacted the former of the
two presumptions, i.e., that the courts shall proceed with an inquiry
into the merits of a claim based upon "an act of ... state in violation
of the principles of compensation and the other standards set out in
this subsection. 8s4 The future of the Sabbatino Amendment is pres-
ently uncertain, as it is being challenged on the remand by the de-
fendants."s The first attack on the amendment in the district court,
which proved to be unsuccessful, was based on the constitutional
grounds of deprivation of property without due process of law and
legislative interference with executive and judicial responsibilities. The
district court felt constrained, however, to enter a judgment until the
Department of State had sufficient opportunity (sixty days) to submit
a formal suggestion of immunity via a "reverse-twist" Bernstein
Letter." The opportunity was formally declined and the district
court accepted the determination of the court of appeals in the initial
litigation as to the validity of the takings under international law. 7
It should be remembered that the Sabbatino decision and amend-
ment are quite narrow in scope. They both deal with the rights of
courts to question the validity of a taking of property by a foreign
state within the territorial confines of that state. An obvious means
of extraction from the legal quagmire is to assume that all takings of
property by a foreign state within its territory are per se legal. This
position is by no means unknown to international law and will be
developed further in the next section.88
D. National Treatment vs. The International Standard of Justice
In arriving at a solution to any international dispute, the deciding
tribunal must measure the behavior of the parties against some stan-
dard of action. Just what the standard should be has been the subject
of a lively dispute between the two basic positions, national treatment
and the international standard.89 The international standard is simply
' Memorandum for the United States, p. 7, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
' Sabbatino Amendment.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
243 F. Supp. at 981. Since communications from the Department of State
conveying executive approval to proceed with litigation were called Bernstein
Letters, it appears proper to refer to communications conveying executive dis-
approval as "reverse-twist" Bernstein Letters.
'See 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 107, 120 (1966).
, See FRIEDMANN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTmNATIONAL LAw 142 (1953).
* RESTATEMENT § 165, comment a.
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the amalgamation of applicable principles which have been derived
from all available sources of international law; national treatment is
the level of treatment which each nation elects to dispense to its own
citizens. The controversy focuses upon the remedies available to an
alien when he feels that a foreign state has deprived him of his rights.
The international standard is deficient in two respects: it is vague,
and it is not universally accepted." A distinct international standard
may make some sense in matters of human rights,9 but it is apt to
generate more heat than light in economic controversies. Basic prin-
ciples of contract have been almost universally adopted, and probably
no maxim is more catholic than pacta sunt servanda. In other words,
if a state honors its obligations at all, national treatment in commercial
matters will probably deviate very slightly, if at all, from the inter-
national standard. Since any benefit hoped for with the international
standard is apt to disappear in litigation, and since the national stan-
dard has the advantage of predictability, the latter is the standard
adopted in the Proposal.2
In expropriation cases, the rights of the investor may differ when
the acts of the state are judged by differing standards. Since acts of
expropriation are contrary to international law,93 they are in deroga-
tion of the international standard. Fundamental to the establishment
of a claim under the national standard, however, is discrimination.
The investor must have been treated differently from other investors,
domestic or foreign, who had been similarly situated prior to expro-
priation. The thesis of the Proposal is that the host countries have
the right to acquire property at will, provided the investor is properly
compensated for his loss. At this point, therefore, questions of dis-
crimination may arise only in regard to compensation since the state
has the right to acquire any property it desires, even if such acquisition
is discriminatory.
Certain exceptions to the duty to compensate, however, are set forth
in the Proposal.4 One exception occurs when the state nationalizes
all private property; another when it nationalizes an entire industry.
There is, of course, no possibility of discrimination occurring in a
total nationalization of all property, but a distinct possibility of dis-
See RESTATEMENT § 165, comments a and d.D'E.g., in the areas of judicial administration, practice of religion, or freedom
from slavery.Proposal art. II, paras. B, C.
See REsTA=TENT § 185.
Proposal art. III, para. B.
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crimination exists in a nationalization of an industry. For example,
a nationalization of the copper industry, would be discriminatory if
only one enterprise existed in the industry and it were alien owned."
Since the state is freed from the obligation to compensate in this case,
it is necessary to insist that a nationalization of an industry, as well
as compensation after nationalization, be free from discrimination.
It should be noted that investors have been formally accepting the
national standard of treatment throughout the last century. Such
acceptance is usually accomplished via a clause in the contract between
the investor and the state in which the investor agrees to be considered
a national for all matters pertaining to the contract, and also renounces
any right or intention to seek intervention by his own state before an
international tribunal in any matter arising out of the investment.
These clauses are usually referred to as "Calvo Clauses"9" whose
effectiveness, although formally denied by the United States ever since
their inception, has been almost universally accepted by the Latin
American countriesY7 In fact, the United States has been loosening
its position somewhat since the North American Dredging case of
1927.11 Although the official United States position has followed the
minority opinion of Commissioner F. K. Nielsen in the International
Fisheries case," in practice, the Department of State has given limited
effect to the "Calvo Clause."' The Restatement has adopted this
more liberal Department of State position and relieves a state of
responsibility for economic injury to an alien after an agreement to
that effect if the alien does, in fact, receive national treatment, the
conduct of the state does not violate any international agreement,
and the alien is afforded a bona fide remedy under the laws of the
state.' This position is incorporated into the Proposal which, in
essence, contains a "Calvo Clause" to which all investors registering
under the agreement must adhere.10 2
'A nationalization decree of this type would not be discriminatory in its
"form," but would be in "fact." This is the reason for the language of art. III,
para. B, § 2 of the Proposal
Metzger, Property in International Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 594, 598 (1964).
5 HACKWORTH, IN=rNATioNAL LAw 635 (1st ed. 1943).
'United States (North American Dredging Co. of Texas) v. United Mexican
States, General Claims Commission, Opinion 21 (1927), in BIsHoP, CASES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 710 (1962).
General Claims Commission, Opinion 207 (1931), in BisHoP, CASES ON INTRM-
NATIONAL LAW 716 (1962).
'1' RESTATEMENT § 202, Reporter's note.
101 REsTATEMENT § 202.
"2 Proposal art. II, paras. B, C (national treatment); art. IV, para. C (non-
intervention).
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E. The Right to Acquire Property and the Definition of "Value"
All of the documents previously discussed have looked upon takings
of property as capable of being either right or wrong under inter-
national law. The Proposal, on the other hand, grants each country the
right to acquire private property at will, and every taking is therefore
right under international law, ab initio.1 3 Each acquisition of prop-
erty, however, carries with it a duty to compensate the investor for
his property,"' save in certain exceptional situations. 10 Contrast
this stand with the Restatement position which holds that a taking
is wrong if (a) it is not for a public purpose, (b) there is no reasonable
provision for compensation or (c) the property is in transit through
the taking state.00
It can be seen that under the Proposal, no investigation need be
made into the nature of the taking. Compensation becomes automati-
cally due upon determination that an acquisition occurred, and, as
will be shown infra, the amount of compensation will have been agreed
to beforehand. By contrast, the Restatement requires a decision upon
the merits as to the purpose of the taking and the provisions for
compensation in order to determine the validity of the taking. Hence,
in the Restatement's view, it is the validity of the taking, not the
taking itself that activates the requirement for compensation. It is
suggested that this approach focuses on the wrong issue. The investor
seeks compensation regardless of the reason for the taking. The
expropriating nation is not desirous of litigating the motives behind
its behavior, and its willingness to pay would seem at best unaffected
by resolution of such an issue. Thus, attention should be directed at
the terms and conditions of compensation in the event of expropriation,
and not on the act itself. The position is illustrated by comparing it
with the Restatement approach.
The public purpose or public utility principle is so questionable
today that it can hardly be considered a rule of law.107 The authors
of the Harvard Draft themselves admit that they have retained the
criterion solely because of the frequency with which it has been
employed in the past, and this retention was accomplished only "with
' Id. art. III, para. A.
Id. art. III, para. B.
Id. art. III, para. B, §§ 1, 2, 3.
RESTATEMENT § 815.
7' See generally WHITE, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 145-50 (1961);
RESTATEMENT § 185, comment b.
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some hesitation."'' 0 The previous use of the principle, moreover, has
been confined exclusively to inclusion in treaties; it has never formed
the basis of a legal decision concerned with a taking of property.
Perhaps when the concepts of capitalism and private property were
more universally espoused than they are today, the principle had
relevance. With a significant percentage of the world operating under
socialist or communist legal systems, the principle appears to have
limited utility in international controversies."0 9
The question to be answered, however, is, "Should the principle of
public utility be the criterion of the validity of a taking of the property
of an alien by a state?" The answer is an unqualified "No" for two
reasons. First, the principle is not necessary to accomplish a proper
protection of alien property, and secondly, it adds an extremely cloudy
issue to an already complex controversy. Any protective scheme based
on something other than sheer respect for property is compensatory
in nature. The Harvard and O.E.C.D. Drafts and the Restatement
all provide for some form of payment to the investor for his loss. Yet
all require an establishment of wrongfulness before the investor has
a claim. Under the Proposal, the investor simply establishes his loss
and he is then automatically entitled to compensation. The unneces-
sary and confusing question of the purpose of the taking is avoided.
By focusing solely on compensation, it becomes clear that what is
needed is a framework within which the investor's economic interest
can be determined with precision. To date, this problem has been
largely neglected. 10
The Restatement calls for a reasonable provision for compensation.
"Just compensation" is defined as being adequate, prompt, and effec-
tively realizable."' "Adequacy" is further defined as being reasonable
under the circumstances, according to the "international standard of
justice," and under ordinary circumstances, equal to the full value of
the property." 2 "Reasonable promptness" means promptness that is
reasonable under the international standard." 3 "Effectiveness" means
cash or property readily convertible into cash of the alien's state."
It appears impossible to draw any standards which might be useful in
an actual determination of compensation from the above definitions.
These definitions are no more than the furthest refinement thus far of
I Sohn & Baxter, supra note 44, explanatory note to art. 10, 55 Am. J. INrL L.
545, 556 (1961).See note 106 supra. - Id. § 188.
Uo Metzger, supra note 96, at 602. 2 Id. § 189.
m RESTAEMENT § 187. U Id. § 190.
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the "adequate, effective, and prompt" provision of the United States-
Mexican correspondence of 1938,"' one of the most overworked pieces
of communication in the entire field of international law. Given the
duty to compensate, there can be no questioning the objective of these
standards; the problem lies solely in their failure to achieve any
workable definitions.
The last two aspects of the Restatement definition of "just com-
pensation" are relatively simple to improve. "Prompt" could easily
be defined as a fixed amount of time, say six months, subject to
contractual amendment. The definition of "effectively realizable"
could be changed from being "readily convertible into cash of the
alien's state" to "cash of the alien's state." This definition would
also serve as a basis for any negotiated modifications. These defini-
tions are adopted in the Proposal.n6
Unfortunately, "adequacy" has been a very complex matter as is
readily illustrated by the classic expropriation controversy, the Chor-
zow Factory case.11 7 When the court instructed the experts on the
matter of assessing damages, apparently it could not decide what was
contained in the concept of "adequacy," for in essence it asked:. 8
I. A. What was the value on the date of taking of possession of
the factory at Chorzow by the agent of the Polish govern-
ment?
B. What would the factories have earned (or lost) if the former
owners had retained possession from the date of taking to
the present?
II. What would the value at date of judgment be of the factory
at Chorzow?
Quaere: What is meant by "value"? Does value mean book value,
fair market value, fair value, or what? And once the proper term is
chosen, what standards are to be used in determining its actual dollar
equivalent? The inability of the court in the Chorzow Factory case to
do more than issue "informative" instructions on evaluating the con-
fiscated property stemmed from its own inability to define "value"
The correspondence took place between Secretary of State Hull and the
Mexican Ambassador, commencing on July 21, 1938. The entire series is contained
in 3 HACKWORTH, INTERNATioNAL LAW 655-65 (1942), U.S. Dep't of State, 19
Press Releases 50, 136, 139, 165 (1938), and BisHop, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL
LAw 677-86 (1962). The quotation comes from the Secretary's letter of August 22,
1938.
Proposal art. III, para. E.
a P.C.I.J., Ser. A., No. 13 (1928).
u Id. at 51.
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with any degree of precision. It is submitted that the concept of
"value" is so subjective as to be incapable of precise definition. The
Proposal avoids this problem by adopting a system of liquidated
damages based upon capitalized values." 9
In most cases of evaluation arising under an expropriation contro-
versy, the subject matter will be some income-producing operation.
Non-income-producing objects which have been obtained as a result
of income, such as cash, are more likely to have a relatively fixed
value, and, therefore, are not likely to be the subject of an evaluation
dispute. An income-producing operation, normally a business firm,
is capable of carrying a range of values, 20 and therefore to define value
as being "true value" is to overlook the entire problem.
Value does not exist in the abstract, but must be spoken of in
relation to a particular person. In an expropriation controversy, value
should be considered as value to the former owner. This is simply
another way of saying that in computing compensation, the owner is
being compensated for the loss of value to him. It is immaterial what
the new owner has gained.' 2 ' The value of the investment, then, is
no more than what the owner considers it to be worth to himself.
It is a short step to what is normally considered to be "market
value." For, if the value sought is the value that the owner himself
places on the investment, this value must be equated to what the
investment is worth on the market. The concept of market value is
used to eliminate any personal overvaluations on the part of the former
owner, 22 and it places him in the position of the ubiquitous "reason-
able man." Market value is therefore usually defined as the price at
which a willing seller would transfer his property to a willing buyer
given ample time for negotiation.123
Markets are considered by economists to exist whenever property
is exchanged. A perfect market would be one in which all sellers could
present all goods to all buyers and receive exactly what the buyers
Proposal art. III, para. C, § 2.
"'Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comn'n, 262 U.S. 276, 310 (1922)(Brandeis, J. concurring; Holmes, 3. concurring with Brandeis, J.).
'Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1948).
'-When discussing market value, one should take particular account of the power
of a state to regulate the use of property in this type of case. A good example is
given by RESTATEMENT § 188, ill. 2, in which a state nationalized an electric power
utility which was earning 25% on its investment, but compensated the former owner
on the basis of 10% returns since this was an average rate of return for investments of
this type. This is a justifiable devaluation of the worth of the investment.
'The standard example is the stock exchange where securities bearing no
inherent value are sold by willing sellers to willing buyers both of whom have
taken as much time as desired for negotiation.
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have paid for the property exchanged. Naturally, no absolutely perfect
market exists, although the commercial exchanges come close to the
ideal. Suppose we have sellers willing to sell and buyers willing to buy,
but no buyers willing to buy at a price to which the sellers will agree.
Economists would still say that a market exists, albeit an imperfect
one. This is at the opposite end of the scale from the perfect market,
and unfortunately, is frequently part of the background situation in
expropriation cases. Prior to seizure, how much of a market existed
for the Suez Canal, the oil industry in Iran, or the sugar plantations
in Cuba? Little, if any at all. Market value may be an appropriate
concept when determining the value of urban real estate, but it is often
most inappropriate in determining the value of an industrial operation
in an underdeveloped country.
Two concepts which are used when market value is unascertainable
are original cost and replacement cost. Original cost has the advantage
of being fairly objective, but frequently bears no relationship to value
at a time subsequent to the creation of the investment. Replacement
cost may be more current, but frequently bears little necessary relation
to value. Consider ,the proverbial widget factory. It may cost
$1,000,000 to replace a factory which cost $750,000 to erect. Obvi-
ously, neither original cost nor replacement cost is a good measure of
value if the factory can produce only $100 worth of widgets per year.
Furthermore, original cost and replacement cost are concerned only
with physical assets. Neither can be applied to intangibles such as
technology, managerial skills, know-how, trademarks, patents, etc.
Furthermore, they are incapable of assessing losses in cases of "creep-
ing expropriation" where it is the earning power of a firm that is
expropriated rather than title to its assets.
As has been recognized, the only comprehensive measurement of
value of commercial property is the expectation of income from it.2 4
In financial terms, this is the capitalization of earnings of the firm. 2'
Capitalization of earnings is equal to the sum of all anticipated net
cash flows which have been discounted by the opportunity cost of
capital.12 1 Unfortunately, valuations based upon capitalized values are
rarely admitted into evidence. Two objections to such admission have
been made: (1) they apply to a whole business and not just to its
physical assets, and (2) the formula is subject to a wide margin of error
' Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1940).
1 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CoRPoRAIONS 296-300 (1953).
""See generally ROBICHEK & MEYERS, Op'nAL FINANCING DECISIONS cL 2(1965).
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which is most difficult to discredit upon cross-examination. 2T The first
criticism is, in fact, a strong reason for the adoption of this measure in
expropriation cases because a taking almost always includes the entire
income producing operation rather than solely the physical assets of the
investment. A taking is not likely, for example, to be merely a taking of
the land on which the factory stands for some other purpose, such as a
right-of-way, with the owner using the money received to reestablish
his operation elsewhere. Expropriation implies a taking of the entire
operation as a going concern (plant, land, trademarks, contract rights,
personnel, etc.) for subsequent operation by the state. Similarly,
"creeping expropriation" is directed at income-producing ability, rather
than at the physical property of the investment.
The second criticism is valid in that the prediction of net income
flows well into the future and the opportunity cost of capital (which
is a function of both market price and commercial risk) are most
difficult to compute. If these were to be agreed upon beforehand,
however, and incorporated into a system of liquidated damages, the
criticism of their vulnerability upon cross-examination disappears. In
negotiations between the prospective investor and the host country,
pressures are brought to bear on both parties to agree to requisite
contractual terms, and it seems likely that some compromise valuation
could be made at this time. (The problem would be entirely different,
of course, after an expropriation where the positions of both parties
would tend to polarize with a view toward letting the tribunal settle
the controversy.) What is even more important here is that most
businessmen evaluate possible investment opportunities in some form
of present value analysis. They typically compare the present value
of income to the present value of expenditures, and if the ratio is
favorable, consider the investment worthwhile. Since most large cor-
porations that are engaged in foreign investment evaluate opportunities
by this method, the requisite data should be readily available. 28 Since
capitalized values are indeed the most accurate measure of the worth
of an enterprise to its owners, and since there is every reason to believe
they can be agreed upon beforehand, it is suggested that the "ade-
quacy" of compensation be defined in these terms. This is the
approach taken in the Proposal.129
'2 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 430 (1937). This two-volume work is
the only available comprehensive treatise on value. It is indeed unfortunate that it
has not been brought up to date.
' See IsTVAN, CAPITAL-EXPENDITURE DEcIsIoNs: How THEY ARE MADE IN LARGE
CORPORATIONS (1961), especially ch. 7, "The Measure of Acceptability."
Proposal art. III, para. C, § 2.
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V. THE Proposal
The agreement which immediately follows is a model for a bilateral
treaty which can be entered into by the United States and any other
country in which United States businessmen will be investing. It is
bilateral in form simply because it will be far simpler for the United
States to negotiate a series of these treaties with various countries
than to attempt to secure the simultaneous agreement of several
nations in matters on which there is so little accord. Only the essen-
tials are set out in the Proposal; the diplomatic language is left to
to the draftsman.
THE PROPOSAL
The United States of America and X, desirous of encouraging the
flow of private capital from 'the United States to X, and mindful of
the need for reducing the risks to which such capital might be
subject while within the territory of X, and in order to make the
opportunities existent in X more attractive to the investors of the
United States, agree to the rules and principles set forth below:
I. The United States agrees to use all means at its disposal to
encourage its investors to participate in the economic devel-
opment of X. It specifically agrees:
A. To make available technical, financial and legal experts to
assist in planning the economic development of X in
accordance with the desires of X for its own future; 3 '
B. To assist prospective investors in the preparation of
economic and industrial surveys;
C. To make readily available to prospective investors all
information pertinent to investment opportunities in X.
This shall include, but shall not be limited to, publication
of industrial, commercial, and agricultural developments;
of applicable laws and legal decisions; and of relevant
political announcements; 13
D. To provide all personnel, data, and funds necessary to
implement the registration system described in article III,
paragraph C. infra.
II. A. The United States agrees to recognize and to abide by
1 For a discussion of the importance of this aspect of economic development,
see PEPELA S, fJIs & ADELMAN, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 132-60 (1961).
" The suggestion to set up a similar clearinghouse of information has been
made to private United States businessmen. COMMITTEE FOR EcONOmic DEVELOP-
MENT, E ONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AssIsTANcE 27 (1957).
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the right of X to develop its own laws and legal principles
as it sees fit, with particular regard to the rights which
issue from the ownership, procurement, or transfer of
private property.
B. The United States further agrees to insist upon no higher
standard of treatment for its citizens, as regards the rights
that have been or shall be secured through the ownership,
procurement, or transfer of private property, than is
afforded by X to its own citizens.
C. X likewise agrees to afford citizens of the United States,
as regards the rights that have been secured through the
ownership, procurement, or transfer of private property,
treatment at least equal to that received by its own
citizens.
III. A. The United States specifically recognizes that X has the
right to acquire private property, whether owned by
citizens of X or of the United States, for any purpose
whatsoever.
B. X specifically recognizes that in acquiring private pro-
perty it has a duty to compensate the former owners for
their loss which shall be the value of their property at the
time of the acquisition. There shall be no duty to com-
pensate in the following cases, and these cases shall be the
only exceptions:
1. A comprehensive acquisition of all private property
located within the territorial confines of X pursuant
to a plan of nationalization, providing that no com-
pensation at all is paid.
2. A specific nationalization of all private property of
a certain type located within the territorial confines
of X, providing, however, that such acquisition is
not discriminatory, either in form or in fact.
3. An acquisition of an investment, or any part
thereof, when the investor had reasonable notice
before the transfer of any capital to the invest-
ment, that such investment would be acquired by
X. Registration under article III, paragraph C
shall be prima facie evidence that the investor did
not have such notice.
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The burden of proof of the existence of an exception is
upon the party urging the exception.
C. In order to minimize the disputes that may arise upon an
acquisition, X and the United States agree to the follow-
ing scheme of registrations for investments:
1. All prospective investors will submit their invest-
ment proposals to a registry of the government of
X which shall examine such proposals and register
those which it deems will further the economic inter-
ests of X.
2. The certificate of registration shall show, inter alia,
the expected cash flows of the investment, discoun-
ted by the opportunity cost of the capital invested.
The opportunity cost shall reflect both the market
price of the capital invested and the commercial risk
of the investment. Entries shall be made for the first
twenty years of the investment, and at the end of
each year a new entry shall be made so as to keep
the total number of entries at twenty. The value of
the investment at any time is hereby agreed to be
the sum of all remaining cash flows. Opportunity
shall be afforded to renegotiate any or all entries
upon determination by either party that such entries
do not continue to represent the expected discounted
cash flows.
D. Should a total acquisition of the investment by X occur,
X shall immediately be liable to the investor for the total
value of the investment as agreed in article III, para-
graph B and as defined in article III, paragraph A, section
2. Should a partial acquisition occur, X shall immedi-
ately be liable for the proportional part of the investment
acquired. The burden of proof of the extent of the
proportional taking is upon the party urging a propor-
tional rather than a total taking.
E. Compensation shall be paid within six months from the
date of the taking in United States dollars unless other
arrangements shall be agreed to by both X and the
investor.
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IV. A. Should a dispute between an investor registered under
the provisions of this agreement and X arise as to an
obligation flowing from this agreement, or from a registra-
tion issued under it, such dispute shall be submitted to the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes authorized under the auspices of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development by the Con-
vention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes be-
tween States and Nationals of other States.
B. The provisions of the present treaty, when ratified, shall
be considered to constitute the consent in writing by X
and the investors of the United States registered in accor-
dance with its provisions to submit their disputes to the
Centre as required by article 25(1) of the Convention.
The provisions shall also constitute agreement to the rules
of law specified in article 42 (1) of said Convention.
C. Both X and the United States, sponsor of this agreement
for its investors, furthermore specifically agree that access
to the courts of either country in order to settle judicially
a dispute so arising shall not be afforded to either party
and that the Centre shall be the only body authorized to
settle such disputes.
D. X hereby specifically waives any claim to the defense of
sovereign immunity as to either the jurisdiction of the
Centre or the enforcement of its awards.
V. The following definitions of terms used in this agreement
are hereby adopted for use herein:
A. Investor - any person or juridical person who shall
arrange for the placement of capital into an investment
located within the territorial confines of X with the pur-
pose of deriving an income from such investment.
B. Investment-any property located within the territorial
confines of X utilized according to a predetermined plan
devised by the investor for the purpose of earning an
income.
C. Capital-any property of the investor which shall have
been transferred to the investment.
D. Property-tangible possessions, and intangibles which
shall include, but which shall not be limited to, manage-
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rial skills, technical know-how, contractual arrangements,
patents, secret processes, trademarks, and copyrights; or
rights and interests owned in, or obligations due under the
above described possessions.
E. Value, as used in this agreement, shall always be defined
as in article III, paragraph A, section 2.
F. To acquire-to take possession of any of the property of
an investment, or to interfere unreasonably with the use,
enjoyment, or transfer of such property. An unreason-
able interference shall include, but shall not be limited to,
imposition of exorbitant taxes, denial of access to requi-
site industrial inputs or to commercial markets, unwar-
ranted interferences with the management or labor force
of the investment, or with their pay scales, or blockage of
funds belonging to the investor, the investment or any
associated personnel.
G. Cash flows and opportunity cost shall be the commonly
understood terms of the present value formula
20
Ft
PV_ (1 r) t
Ft = net cash flows to investment
r = opportunity cost of capital
t = period (year)
An explanation of the present value formula may be in order. 2' If
a principal P is invested at a rate i for n years, the amount A which the
principal will be worth after n years is found by the compound interest
formula A = P(1 -- i)n.The amount A is the answer to the question,
"How much will $P be worth after n years if it is invested at rate i?"
Now ask, "How much will have to be invested at rate i to be worth
amount A at the end of n years?" The answer to this is, of course,
principal P. Present values are, in essence, the answer to the same
question. To put the question in a form more applicable to the concept
of present value, one should ask "What is an amount A which is to be
invested for n years at a rate i worth today?" The answer is P or, here,
the present value of PV of A.
To return to the compound interest formula, A = P (I + i) n, it can
"'See generally, ALCHIAN & ALLEN, UNvRSITY ECONOMICS ch. 15 (1964).
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be seen that this is the amount that a single principal will be worth
after n years. If a new, identical, principal were to be added each
year, a new amount A would have to be computed for each new prin-
cipal. Thus, the formulae would appear as: [A 1 = P(l + i) n] +
[A 2 =P(l +i) - '] + [A3 P(l +i) -1 ] + ... + [A.- P(I +i) -']
since each succeeding principal is invested for one less year. In math-
ematical notation, this would be written as
n
P(1± + i)n
n1
where the Greek letter Sigma simply means to sum all the terms of the
expression P( 1 + i) n as the value of n ranges from 1 to n. (In compu-
ting this sum, the terms would appear in reverse order from what was
just shown, i.e., as (P(l + i) ± P(1 + i)2 + P(1 + i) 3 + . . .-
P(1 + i)n), but this reversal of sequence will, of course, not change
the value of their sum.)
Solving the compound interest formula for P, we have P=A/( 1-i)n,
or, in present value terms, PV = A/( 1 + i)" . If all we were looking for
is the present value of a single amount A, this formula would suffice.
But the firm is expected to have separate cash flows accruing each
successive year. A summing-up process similar to that described for
compound interest must now be applied. The formula for a sum of
present values is, therefore:
n
A
(l+i).
n=l
This formula is very close to the one included in the Proposal. The
variation in cash flow to the firm accounts for the differences. The
amount A is, in reality, the net cash flows, F, that the firm expects to
receive each year. Since they will probably not be identical, the form-
ula allows them to fluctuate by providing for a different net flow Ft
each year. (t, or "time," is identical in function to n which is a
more general term.)
If we were computing present values in a no-risk situation (which,
of course, never exists) the formula would be complete as it stands.
In fact, it is quite acceptable when dealing with minimum risk securi-
ties, such as government bonds. In an investment in an underdeveloped
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country, however, the element of risk is very significant. The interest
rate, or discount rate, as it is called when dealing with present values,
must reflect the existing risk. The risk here is not simply the risk of
expropriation with which we have been dealing throughout this note
but commercial risk in its general sense. This risk is reflected in the
formula by adding an arbitrary amount to the market cost of capital i,
so that the discount rate now equals the opportunity cost of capital r.133
The formula in the Proposal, also does not allow the summation to
continue ad infinitum. The reason for this limitation is that the values
for each term rapidly fall off after a relatively small number of terms.
This will be demonstrated (see Table 1) by computing the values of
the expression, Ft/(1 + r)l where Ft is constant (although it need
not be) and equal to $100, and r = 15 per cent. 1 + r, therefore, equals
1.15.
Table 1 shows the present values of $100 at the end of each year
from year 1 to 20 assuming the opportunity cost of capital to be
Table 1
t 1.15t 100 / 1.15t
1 1.15 $ 87.00
2 1.32 75.80
3 1.52 65.80
4 1.75 57.20
5 2.00 50.00
6 2.32 43.20
7 2.66 37.60
8 3.06 32.70
9 3.53 28.30
10 4.05 24.80
11 4.65 21.50
12 5.35 18.80
13 6.16 16.20
14 7.10 14.00
15 8.17 12.20
16 9.39 10.60
17 10.38 9.70
18 11.95 8.40
19 13.95 7.30
20 15.79 6.30
r The understandable inability of financial management specialists to provide
accurate value of this term is, of course, one reason why this formula bears certain
inherent inaccuracies. There is no reason, however, why the differences in opinion
between the state and the investor as to the value of the opportunity cost of capital
could not be bargained-out. For current studies on the cost of capital, see generally
SOLOMON, THE MANAGEMENT OF CORPORATE CAPITAL (1959) ; SoLomON, THEORY OF
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (1963).
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15 per cent. The present value of $100 to be paid at the end of 1 year
is $87.00, at the end of 10 years is $24.80, etc. The present value of
two payments of $100, one to be made at the end of 1 year and
another at the end of 10 years is $87.00 ± $24.80 or $111.80. The
present value, then, of twenty consecutive annual payments of $100
each when the opportunity cost of the capital is 15 per cent is the
sum of all entries in the right hand column, or $627.40. The important
point to note is that if t were allowed to range from one to infinity,
the sum of all the values of $100/1.15t would be less than $670! The
reason for arbitrarily limiting the number of terms to be bargained
for to twenty should be now obvious. The real significance of this
discussion is that since the value of a firm equals its expected earnings,
this value can be very closely approximated by estimating the net cash
flows over a relatively short period of time.
VI. The Proposal Applied to an Actual Expropriation
In order to illustrate how the Proposal would operate in practice,
its provisions are applied to a recent expropriation case. The case is
set in the Republic of the Philippines which may find itself embroiled
in expropriation controversies before long because of several judicial
decisions interpreting its Nationalization of Retail Trade Act.' This
statute was passed as a result of the aura of nationalism which has
dominated the politics of the Philippines since its independence in
1946.135 On its face, the act simply made it unlawful for any person
who is not a citizen of the Philippines, or any business association
whose capital was not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, to
engage in retail trade.' Retail trade was defined as "any act, occupa-
tion or calling of habitually selling direct to the general public
merchandise, commodities, or goods for consumption" 37 with certain
presently irrelevant exceptions. Individuals who were engaged in retail
trade were allowed to continue in business for life, and business
associations were given ten years in which to wind up their opera-
tions. 1 38
" Republic Act No. 1180.
" Cf. Peck, Administrative Law and the Public Law Environment in the
Philippines, 40 WASH. L. REv. 403, 429 (1965) for the view that the original
purposes of the act were directed at the local Chinese who dominated the retail
trade business. But cf. Campbell, The Philippines, "Sugar, Rice and a Great Deal of
Vice" The New Republic, March 12, 1966, pp. 21-24.
"Republic Act No. 1180, § 1.
"Id. § 4.
'Id. § 1.
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Central Azucarera Don Pedro is a Spanish corporation which was
engaged in the manufacture of sugar and derivative products including
molasses, dry yeast, and alcohol. All of its output was sold to industrial
customers who further processed the products into poultry feeds, and
denatured and rectified alcohol. Don Pedro was considered to be
engaged beyond the ten year grace period in the "retail business,"
which was interpreted to include "not only sales in limited quantities
to the ultimate consumer of goods for personal or hould [sic] consump-
tion, but also sales by manufacturers or producers of goods for indus-
trial or commercial consumption."'5 9 In addition to criminal penalties
upon the directors, the corporation faced immediate dissolution of its
Philippine operations.
Assume that Spain, and not the United States, was signatory to the
Proposal with the Philippines, and that the Proposal was in effect
before passage of the Nationalization of Retail Trade Act. Don Pedro
is a registrant under the provisions of the Proposal and feels that its
Philippine assets have been expropriated. What result?
The first question that must be answered is, "Was there an acquisi-
tion of Don Pedro's property?" "Acquisition" is defined, 4' inter alia,
as an unreasonable interference with the use of one's property. An
unreasonable interference includes denial of access to commercial
markets. Even though no property was actually taken, an acquisition
may have occurred through unreasonable interference with the normal
use of the Don Pedro production facilities. If it can be established
that the products of Don Pedro had, in fact, been denied access to
their markets, an acquisition of Don Pedro's property under the terms
of the Proposal had occurred.
The next question is, "Did the Philippines incur a duty to compen-
sate Don Pedro for its property?" The Philippines has a duty to
compensate the former owners for their losses in all cases except for
instances of comprehensive nationalizations, specific, but non-discrim-
inatory, nationalizations of a single industry, and when the former
owner had reasonable notice that his property would be acquired. 4'
No comprehensive nationalization occurred, so that exception is elimi-
nated. The nationalization of the entire retail trade industry was a
specific nationalization of property of a certain type, but it did not
' Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Balmaceda, Civil Case No. 57553, Ct of
First Instance of Manila, Dec. 7, 1965, at 14.
" Proposal art. V, para. F.
'"Id. art. III, para. B.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
include all property of that type. The property of the Filipinos was
not nationalized. This makes out a prima facie case of discrimination,
and eliminates this exception. Did Don Pedro have notice of the
legislation? Clearly, Don Pedro had no notice so far as any assets
transferred to its investment before the passage of the act, unless it
can be established that Don Pedro had notice while the act was being
discussed in the Philippine Congress. Furthermore, Don Pedro might
not have had notice as to any assets transferred to its investment after
the passage of the act. The act did not on its face apply to industrial
suppliers. This extension was purely a creature of the Philippine
courts.'42 Certainly, if the Proposal's Registry approved the registra-
tion of additional assets, Don Pedro had no notice. So, if Don Pedro
had no notice, the duty to compensate remains.
The last question is, "What is the amount of compensation due to
Don Pedro?" This would be determined by reference to its registration
certificate, and would equal the total value shown or the summation
of all twenty entries, if acquisition were determined to have occurred
at the date of judgment of the decision. It is interesting to note that
if Don Pedro had been clearly engaged in retail trade at the time of
passage of the act and voluntarily abandoned its investment at the
end of ten years, the Philippine government would be liable only for
the sum of the last ten entries on the certificate. This would be a
relatively small amount and would probably be less than what Don
Pedro could have received for its property even in a deflated market. 4 '
Since Don Pedro would be required to mitigate damages, and if it did
actually receive more in the sale of its assets than the liability of the
government, the Philippines would not have to pay Don Pedro any-
thing. Similarly, if the act gave Don Pedro twenty years, rather than
ten, to wind up its affairs, the government would incur no liability by
definition. These two results occur because Don Pedro would not have
lost anything either under the terms of the certificate, or in actuality,
since the certificate represents, as closely as can be determined, the
future earnings of Don Pedro.
Paul M. Goldberg*
142 See Peck, supra note 135, at 429.
' As an example, assume that Don Pedro's certificate estimated net cash flows
of $10,000 per year (although the amount need not be constant) and that the
opportunity cost equalled 15%. The last ten entries of the certificate would then
be the same as the last ten entries of Table 1, multiplied by a factor of 10. The total
amount due Don Pedro then would be $12,500 or slightly more than a year's net
profits.
* Third year law student, University of Washington.
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